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COMMENT
JUST ONE QUESTION BEFORE WE GET TO
OHIO V. ROBINE7TE:1 "ARE You CARRYING
ANY CONTRABAND ... WEAPONS, DRUGS,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS ...
ANYTHING LIKE THAT?
9
It seems rather incongruous at this point in the world's
history that we find totalitarian states becoming more like
our free society while we in this nation are taking on their
former trappings of suppressed liberties and freedoms....
In this 'anything goes' war on drugs, random knocks on
the doors of our citizens' homes seeking 'consent' to
search for drugs cannot be far away. This is not America.'
Liberty comes not from officials by grace but from the
Constitution by right.3
INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 1992, Robert D. Robinette, not unlike many of
his fellow Ohioans, was unfortunate enough to get caught speeding.
Robinette had been traveling along a stretch of Interstate 70, north
of Dayton, Ohio, when Deputy Roger Newsome of the Montgom-
ery County Sheriff's Office clocked him traveling at 69 miles per
hour.4 After pulling the vehicle over, Deputy Newsome approached
117 S. Ct. 417 (1996), rev'g State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995).
United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 788-789, rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (1990).
' Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. CL 882, 891 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996). The incident occurred in a
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Robinette and asked to see his driver's license.' A computer
check revealed no previous or outstanding violations, and Newsome
asked Robinette to accompany him to the rear of the vehicle so he
would be within the view of the cruiser's mounted video camera.6
After turning on the camera, the deputy issued Robinette a verbal
warning about his speeding and returned his license.
Upon returning the license, Deputy Newsome stated, "One
question before you get gone: are you carrying any illegal contra-
band in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like
that?"' Robinette answered no, at which point Newsome asked if
he could search the vehicle.9 Robinette, shocked and apparently
unaware of his right to refuse, gave Newsome his consent.'0 The
search turned up a small amount of marijuana and an amphetamine
pill, upon which Robinette was arrested and charged with knowing
possession of a controlled substance."
Prior to trail, Robinette filed a motion to suppress the evidence
found in the search of his vehicle. The trial court denied the
motion, finding that Deputy Newsome had made it clear to
Robinette that the traffic matter had concluded before asking to
search the vehicle.' Robinette then pled no contest, was adjudi-
cated guilty, and appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress. 4 The Court of Appeals for Montgomery County re-
versed the conviction, ruling that Robinette's consent had resulted
construction zone where the speed limit had been reduced to 45 miles per hour. See id.
s. See id. Before doing so, Newsome had already decided to issue only a verbal
warning, as was his routine practice with speeders in that particular construction zone. See
State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S.
CL 417 (1996).
6 See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
" See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419.
Id. At the time, Deputy Newsome was on drug interdiction patrol. See State v.
Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419.
" See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696. According to the Ohio Supreme Court,
"Robinette testified that he was shocked at the question and 'automatically' answered
.yes' to the deputy's request. Robinette testified further that he did not believe that he
was at liberty to refuse the deputy's request." Id.
" See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419. The pill was later determined to be
methylenedioxy methamphetamine (MDMA). See id. MDMA is also referred to as Ecsta-
cy. See State v. Robinette, No. 14074, 1994 WL 147806, at *1 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Apr.
15, 1994).
'z See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419.
" See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419.
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from an unlawful detention."5 The Supreme Court of Ohio allowed
a discretionary appeal in which it affirmed the appellate court's
decision, and in doing so took the additional step of requiring that
any attempt at consensual interrogation subsequent to a traffic stop
must be preceded by the phrase "At this time you legally are free
to go" or words of similar import.'6
The case reached the United States Supreme Court in its 1996-
97 Term, when, by an 8-1 vote, the Court rejected the test an-
nounced by the Ohio Supreme Court.7 The majority opinion,
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution does not require that a
lawfully seized defendant be advised that he or she is "free to go"
before a consent search will be recognized as voluntary."8
This Comment begins in Part I by discussing prior caselaw
associated with voluntary consent searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment. Part II then presents the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court, and the United States Supreme Court majority opinion of
Chief Justice Rehnquist reversing the Ohio court. Also included are
reviews of the concurring opinion of Justice Ginsberg and the dis-
senting opinion of Justice Stevens. Part I criticizes the majority
opinion for its paucity of analysis and lack of supporting caselaw,
and questions the accuracy with which the United States Supreme
Court formulated the issue at stake in the Ohio court. Finally, Part
IV concludes that the "free-to-go" rule in the context of routine
traffic stops is necessary in order to effectively eliminate the poten-
tial for police officers to engage in coercive investigative tech-
niques, and to provide adequate protection for Ohio citizens to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures. By basing the rule on
Ohio law, the Ohio Supreme Court can ensure that such a rule will
withstand the scrutiny of a United States Supreme Court that in-
creasingly appears to view any successful search as a reasonable
one.
" See State v. Robinette, No. 14074, 1994 WL 147806 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. Apr. 15,
1994).
16. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 419-20.
'7. Justice Ginsberg filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, and Justice
Stevens filed a dissent. See id.
- See id.
1997]
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I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 9 Although primarily directed at the conduct
of law enforcement officers, not all encounters between police
officers and citizens invoke its protections. Currently, there are
three recognized categories of police-citizen encounters: arrests,
seizures, and consensual encounters. 2 0 Not all encounters between
citizens and police officers are considered seizures, but only those
wherein "a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.",2' If the encounter is not a seizure, then the Fourth
Amendment is inapplicable.' In determining whether or not a
seizure has occurred, courts are required to examine all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding an encounter.' Although there is no sin-
gle dispositive factor for determining a seizure, the United States
Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized that whenever a motor-
ist is ordered to pull over by a police officer, a seizure has oc-
curred. 4
Once an encounter has been categorized as a seizure, the
Fourth Amendment is implicated, thereby requiring that the seizure
9. The Fourth Amendment provides in part that "[t~he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Wants shall issue, but upon probable cause... "
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The provisions of the Fourth Amendment are made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
' See Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining
When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 437
(1988) ("Police encounters with citizens are placed into one of three categories:
'communication' between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and there-
fore without the compass of the fourth amendment [sic], brief 'seizures' that must be sup-
ported by reasonable suspicion, and full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable
cause.") (citing United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982)).
2. Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1975) (citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)
("Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred.").
" See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) ("If there is no detention-no sei-
zure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment-then no constitutional rights have
been infringed.").
23 Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572.
24 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) ("Stopping an automobile and
detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amend-
ment]"); see also Butterfoss, supra note 20, at 438 n.9 ("Unlike [the] pedestrian cases, the
Court views virtually any encounter between a police officer and the operator of an au-
tomobile as a seizure.").
[Vol. 48:173
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be "reasonable." Prior to Teny v. Ohioas any seizure was invalid
unless justified by probable cause. In Terry, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that certain seizures falling short of an
arrest were justified based on a police officer's reasonable suspi-
cion that the detainee had committed, or was about to commit, a
crimeY Hence, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may war-
rant a temporary seizure, but only "for the purpose of questioning
limited to the purpose of the stop. ''" Although Terry dealt with
the seizure of pedestrians, in the context of traffic stops, "police
responsibility for traffic enforcement confers a practically boundless
authority to stop."29 Nonetheless, investigative detentions must be
temporary, must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop, and must employ "the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion."
Whether or not a detention is constitutionally valid has an
important bearing on the admissibility of evidence discovered by
police officers during a subsequent search of the detainee's person
or property.' Searches, like seizures, are prescribed by the Fourth
Amendment requirements of reasonableness, and it is a long-stand-
ing principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreason-
able.., subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." '2 One such "specifically established" ex-
ception is the voluntary consent search.
Although the United States Supreme Court has consistently
recognized the constitutional validity of a warrantless search con-
ducted pursuant to a voluntary consent, a more contentious issue
has been whether or not the consent has been given "voluntari-
ly."'33 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Court was called upon
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2f See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1979) ("Terry for the first time
recognized an exception to the requirement that Fourth Amendment seizures of persons
must be based on probable cause.").
"- See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27.
2 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
29. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment on the Road, TRIAL, Feb. 1997, at
66.
See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
3, Indeed, because of the difficulties involved in challenging police testimony at a
suppression hearing that the consent to search was validly made, defendants often have
more success challenging the validity of the initial detention. See Dripps, supra note 29,
at 66.
"' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
33 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). It is settled that the
17719971
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to settle a conflict between the California Court of Appeals and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with respect to a state prosecutor's
burden in demonstrating that a defendant's consent to search had
been voluntarily made.35 The federal court had required the prose-
cutor to show that the defendant had actual knowledge of a right
to refuse consent. The state court had maintained instead that
voluntariness was a factual matter to be determined from the totali-
ty of the circumstances, knowledge being only one factor for con-
sideration.36
The Court in Schneckloth began by examining voluntariness in
the context of criminal confessions, noting that a variety of factors
were considered in determining whether a confession had been
given by "free and unconstrained choice."37 The factors included
age, educational level, the length of the detention, and the
detainee's degree of intelligence, with no single factor regarded as
dispositive." Because the query, as applied to confessions, in es-
sence required a balancing of legitimate police needs against the
possibility of coercion, this "totality of all the circumstances" test
was considered similarly appropriate in the context of consent
searches.39 In as much as this test had effectively filtered out po-
lice coercion, the Court opined that there was no need to replace it
with a test based on demonstrating actual knowledge on the part of
a defendant.'
Nor was it appropriate, ruled the Court, to treat a consent to
search in the same vein as the waiver of a constitutional right. The
concept of waiver, which required the "abandonment of a known
right or privilege,"'" was applicable only in the context of trial
rights, and the Court noted the "vast difference between those
rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment."'42 Similarly, the Court rejected an
burden of proving voluntariness falls on the prosecutor. See Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968).
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
3' See id. at 223.
3 See id.
I d. at 225.
3. See id. at 226.
. Id. at 227.
See id. at 229.
41. Id. at 235.
-2 Id. at 241.
[Vol. 48:173
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argument that its decision in Miranda v. Arizona,43 requiring po-
lice officers to inform defendants in custody of their rights against
self-incrimination, should apply in the consent search context.
Miranda had been justified on the inherently coercive situations
created by custodial surroundings in combination with suspect
police questioning techniques." Because the Court found nothing
to indicate that traffic stops produced an inherently coercive envi-
ronment, there was no need to depart from the totality of the cir-
cumstances test.45
In Schneckloth, the Court paused briefly to consider a sugges-
tion that rather than requiring a defendant to have actual knowl-
edge, it would instead suffice for police officers to inform detained
motorists of their right to refuse consent. The Court rather swiftly
dismissed this requirement as "thoroughly impractical" based on the
"informal and unstructured conditions" in which consent searches
arose. 4 A Miranda style warning was inappropriate in situations
far removed from "the structured atmosphere of a trial."'4
Schneckloth, it should be noted, dealt with a consent to search
made by a defendant who had been legally seized.' However,
courts have imposed a different standard for a consent given while
a defendant is illegally detained. In Florida v. Royer,49 the United
States Supreme Court found that the defendant had been illegally
detained at the time of his consent, and that the consent had been
"tainted by the illegality," rendering it ineffective to justify the
search. In ruling so, the Court applied the Dunaway v New York
test applicable to statements made during illegal detentions, which
requires the state to prove that the consent was not a product of
the illegal detention, but rather "the result of an independent act of
free will."' Hence, the standard used to determine whether or not
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4' See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247 ("In Miranda the Court found that the techniques
of police questioning and the nature of custodial surroundings produce an inherently coer-
cive situation.").
41. See id.
4'- Id. at 231-32.
41. Id. at 232.
' The police officer had a reasonable basis to stop the vehicle based on the fact that
one of the headlights and the license plate light were burned out. See id. at 220.
" 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Id. at 507-08.
. Id. at 501. See also Joseph G. Casaccio, Note, Illegally Acquired Information,
Consent Searches, and Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 842 (1987) (arguing that a vol-
untary consent is insufficient to "purge the taint of prior police misconduct").
17919971
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a consent to search has been voluntarily given depends, in part, on
whether the individual offering the consent has been legally or
illegally detained.
II. THE ROAD To REMAND
A. The Ohio Supreme Court Decision
As the United States Supreme Court was later to note, it is the
settled rule in Ohio that the Supreme Court "speaks as a court only
through the syllabi of its cases." 2 In its 4-3 decision, 3 the sylla-
bus of the Ohio Supreme Court stated as follows:
1. When the motivation behind a police officer's continued
detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not
related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop,
and when that continued detention is not based on any
articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate
illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the
continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure.
2. The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitu-
tions, to be secure in one's person and property requires
that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed
by the detaining officer when they are free to go after a
valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a
consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interro-
gation must be preceded by the phrase "At this time you
legally are free to go" or by words of similar importm
As if to stress the significance of its syllabus, Justice Pfeifer's
majority opinion began by noting that the search of Robinette's
car had been invalid because it had resulted from an unlawful
seizure.5 Relying on Terry v. Ohio56 and State v. Chatton,7 the
52 See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 420 (1996) (citing Ohio v. Gallagher, 425
U.S. 257, 259 (1976)).
"* Justice Pfeifer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Wright, Justice
Resnick, and Chief Justice Moyer. Justice Sweeney filed a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice Douglas and Justice Cook. See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio
1995), rev'd Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
Id. at 696.
5' See id. at 697.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
57 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984). In Chauon, a police officer had stopped a vehicle after
[Vol. 48:173
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court reiterated the requirement that a police officer have additional
articulable facts, arising after the initial stop is made, in order to
detain a motorist beyond the scope of the original stop. 8 Al-
though Deputy Newsome had been justified in stopping Robinette
for the speeding violation, once he had checked Robinette's i-
cense and determined not to issue a speeding ticket to him, the
justification for the detention had ceased. 9 When Newsome or-
dered Robinette out of the car, his detention became illegal.'
This did not end the court's inquiry because, as Justice Pfeifer
noted, a consent, even though obtained during an illegal detention,
may still be valid.6V ' The test for determining the validity of such
a consent, as outlined in Florida v. Royer,62 was whether or not
the state could demonstrate that the consent was not the product of
the illegal detention, but rather the result of an independent act of
free will.' Factors to be considered in determining this included
"the length of time between the illegal seizure and the subsequent
search, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose
and flagrancy of the circumstances."" Proceeding to apply this
test to the facts of the case, the court found that the state had
failed to meet its burden of showing that Robinette's consent to
search the vehicle had been anything other than the result of an
illegal detention.'
Having ostensibly affirmed the decision of the court of appeals,
the majority then turned to the second part of its syllabus, wherein
the court had announced that police officers were required to notify
detained motorists of the point at which their legal detention had
noticing it displayed neither a front nor a rear license plate. See id. at 1237. Upon ap-
proaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a temporary tag in the rear window, which ex-
plained the missing license plates. See id. The officer then asked to see the driver's li-
cense, which had been erroneously listed by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles as suspended.
See id. at 1237-38. The Ohio Supreme Court ruled that once the officer's reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle was not properly licensed or registered had been allayed, it was
unreasonable to detain the driver in order to determine the validity of his license. See id.
at 1240-41.
See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 697.
. See id. at 697-98.
See id. at 698.
61. See id.
61 460 U.S. 491 (1983). For a discussion of this legal test, see supra notes 49-51
and accompanying text.
61 See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
'A Id.
6 See id.
1997]
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concluded.' The court stated that the facts of the case before it
demonstrated the need for a bright-line rule for determining the
point at which a legal detention had ended and a consensual en-
counter had begun.67 While acknowledging that consensual en-
counters were a legitimate and important investigative method for
police officers to employ, the court nevertheless ruled that:
[C]itizens who have not been detained immediately prior to
being encountered and questioned by police are more apt to
realize that they need not respond to a police officer's
questions. A "consensual encounter" immediately following
a detention is likely to be imbued with the authoritative
aura of the detention. Without a clear break from the de-
tention, the succeeding encounter is not consensual at all.
68
The court also stated its concern that police officers were using
subsequent consensual encounters to turn routine traffic stops into
"fishing expedition[s] for unrelated criminal activity." Because
most citizens believed they were still in police custody as long as
an officer continued to question them, and because a reasonable
person would not feel free to walk away under such circumstances,
a rule was needed to protect citizens from being coerced into an-
swering questions that they need not answer. ° Henceforth, the
federal and Ohio constitutions would require any consensual en-
counter subsequent to a traffic stop to be preceded by the phrase
"At this time you legally are free to go," or its equivalent.7!'
Justice Sweeney's dissent took issue with the majority's deter-
mination that Robinette had been illegally detained. Noting that the
traditional test for determining whether or not a person has been
seized under the Fourth Amendment was "whether, taking into
account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the
police conduct 'would have communicated to a reasonable person
' In the first paragraph of the opinion the court stated: "We also use this case to
establish a bright-line test, requiring police officers to inform motorists that their legal de-
tention has concluded before the police officer may engage in any consensual interroga-
tion." Id. at 697.
67. See id. at 698.
Id. at 699.
69 Id.
"" See id. at 698. The court also noted that Deputy Newsome's question, "One
question before you get gone," implied that Robinette could not leave until he had an-
swered it. Id.
I' Id. at 699.
[Vol. 48:173
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that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go
about his business,"' the dissent believed that application of this
test showed that Robinette had not been seized, and was aware of
his right to leave once his license had been returned. 3 In addi-
tion, the dissent chose not to distinguish the legality of Robinette's
detention from the validity of his consent to search because, "[tihe
distinction between being informed of the right to refuse a search
and being informed of the right to leave the scene is insignifi-
cant." Indeed, the dissent apparently construed the issue in the
case as being one of whether "an individual who has been validly
detained pursuant to a traffic stop may, in response to a police
request, give a free and voluntary consent to search, once the traf-
fic stop has been completed and the individual knows he is free to
leave."75 Criticizing the majority's reliance on State v. Chatton
because it had dealt with an unlawful detention and not an invalid
consent,76 the dissent disapproved of the majority's new per se
rule as being "contrary to well-established state and federal consti-
tutional law." Such a rule, it believed, would vastly undercut the
ability of police officers to "ferret out crime."'78
B. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the manner in
which Justice Sweeney's dissent had eliminated the distinction
between the legality of the detention and the validity of the search
was not lost on Chief Justice Rehnquist. Writing for the majori-
ty,' the Chief Justice presented the issue as "whether the Fourth
Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be
advised that he is 'free to go' before his consent to search will be
recognized as voluntary.""
7" Id. (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)).
71 See id. at 700.
' Id. But see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing how validity of
detention effects the test for determining whether consent is voluntary).
71 State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 700 (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
76 See id.
-" Id. at 699.
7 Id.
' Justice Ginsberg filed a separate opinion concurring in judgment, and Justice
Stevens dissented.
' Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996). The actual question presented in
19971
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Before reaching the merits of the question, the majority had
first to deal with the preliminary issue of whether the Court had
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.8 '
Robinette had argued that the decision in the Ohio Supreme Court
had rested on Ohio constitutional law as well as on the Federal
Constitution, and as such, the decision could be viewed as a state
court's exercise of its prerogative to expand upon the liberties
guaranteed citizens under the Federal Constitution.' However, the
Chief Justice quickly disposed of this challenge to jurisdiction by
applying the test outlined in Michigan v. Long, 3 wherein the Su-
preme Court had ruled that:
[When] a state court decision fairly appears to rest primari-
ly on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion,
we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the
state court decided the case the way it did because it be-
lieved that federal law required it to do so."
Having invoked the presumption of Long, the majority found
that the opinion clearly relied on federal law, notwithstanding its
passing reference to the Ohio Constitution.' All of the cases re-
lied upon were federal cases, with the exception of one state case
which applied the Federal Constitution.86 Because there was noth-
the petition for certiorari was "whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution requires police officers to inform motorists, lawfully stopped for traffic violations,
that the legal detention has concluded before any subsequent interrogation or search will
be found to be consensual." Id. at 424 n.l1 (emphasis added). The manner in which the
Chief Justice phrases the issue illustrates the subtle differences involved in the two deci-
sions. If the Ohio Supreme Court had believed, as the Court assumes, that Robinette was
legally seized, presumably there would be no reason to tell him he was free to go, be-
cause he would not in fact be free to go. The Chief Justice simply assumes the very is-
sue that the Ohio Supreme Court had attempted to resolve; see also LEWIS R. KAiZ,
OIno ARREST, SEARcH AND SEzuRE § 15.06 (1997) ("This approach to the issue totally
ignores the question of the continued detention. The highest Court did not discuss the
Ohio position that once the traffic ticket is written, or once the suspicion is dispelled
which justified a Terry-stop, any further detention is illegal.").
81. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 420.
See id.; see also Respondent's Brief at 47-50, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417
(1996) (No. 95-891) (arguing that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision had been warrant-
ed by the Ohio Constitution, and was an attempt to "overprotect" a fundamental right).
83 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
Id. at 1040-41.
See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. CL at 420.
See id.
[Vol. 48:173
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ing to indicate that the Ohio Supreme Court had based its decision
on Ohio constitutional law, jurisdiction existed for the United
States Supreme Court to review the state court's interpretation of
federal law."
The majority had also to dismiss Robinette's argument that
because the Ohio Supreme Court had ruled in the first part of its
syllabus that Robinette had been illegally seized, the Court could
not reach the issue presented for review, viz. whether a consent to
search would be recognized as voluntary in the absence of the
"free to go" language found in the second part of the syllabus.8
However, because Robinette had not raised this issue in his opposi-
tion to certiorari, and because both parties had subsequently briefed
the issue, the Chief Justice ruled that the legality of Robinette's
detention was "a 'predicate to an intelligent resolution' of the
question presented, and therefore 'fairly included therein."'89
Hence, the legality of Robinette's detention became the first sub-
stantive issue for the Court to decide.
With reference to the Ohio Supreme Court's determination that
Newsome's interrogation of Robinette had gone beyond the scope
of the initial stop, the Chief Justice simply stated that "in light of
the admitted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding, Deputy
Newsome was objectively justified in asking Robinette to get out
of the car, subjective thoughts notwithstanding," and hence,
Robinette had not been illegally detained.' Apparently believing
that the Ohio court had relied on Newsome's subjective inten-
tions9 in order to find his conduct unconstitutional, the majority
pointed to its recent decision in Whren v. United States,' in
' See id. The Court also rejected a challenge to its jurisdiction based on the fact
that in Ohio, "the Supreme Court speaks as a court only through the syllabi of its cases."
Id. The Chief Justice noted that when a syllabus refers only generally to the federal and
Ohio constitutions, the Court may review the body of the opinion in order to determine
the grounds for its decision, which review confirmed the lack of an adequate and inde-
pendent state ground. See id.
el See id.
E9 Id.
9 Id. at 421. The court cited Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), which
had itself announced a bright-line rule that it was per se reasonable for a police officer
to order the driver of a vehicle which has been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation to
get out of the vehicle. This rule has since been extended to passengers traveling in law-
fully stopped vehicles. See Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
9. The Ohio Supreme Court had noted that "from the outset [Newsome] never intend-
ed to ticket Robinette for speeding." State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio
1995), rev'd, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. CL 419 (1996).
9L 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
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which the Court had ruled that a police officer's subjective moti-
vations would not operate to make'an otherwise legal detention
illegal, as long as there existed objective evidence to support the
officer's conduct.93 Having determined that Robinette had not
been illegally seized, the Chief Justice turned to the issue presented
for review: Whether the Fourth Amendment required a lawfully
sized detainee be told he or she is "free to go" before voluntarily
consenting to be searched.
The Court began by outlining its general position that reason-
ableness under the Fourth Amendment "is measured in objective
terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."94 Such a
test, the Court opined, had proved to be the most effective method
of recognizing the endless variety of factual circumstances implicat-
ed in Fourth Amendment analysis.95 In addition, the Court claimed
to have "consistently eschewed bright-line rules" in determining
whether or not police conduct had been reasonable, preferring
instead to develop what the Court referred to as its "traditional
contextual approach."" By way of example, the majority pointed
to its decisions in Michigan v. Chesternut7 and Florida v.
Bostick."
The Chief Justice then noted the similarity of the rule promul-
gated by the Ohio Supreme Court to the rule rejected by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court's prior decision in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 9 wherein the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
required that the state demonstrate a defendant's knowledge of his
or her right to refuse to consent before a consent would be recog-
nized as voluntary."° In rejecting that rule, the Court had found
' See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 420-21 (citing Whren v. United States, 116
S. Ct 1769, 1774 (1996)) ("The fact that [an] officer does not have the state of mind
which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the offi-
cers action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action."). The Court acknowledged that Whren had been decided
after the Ohio Supreme Court had made its decision. See id. at 420.
' Id. at 421.
See id.
9& Id.
'7 486 U.S. 567 (1975) (rejecting a bright-line rule in the investigatory pursuit con-
text).
9" 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (striking down a Florida Supreme Court rule that police ques-
tioning aboard a bus was per se a seizure).
9 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
'o See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. CL at 421. For a discussion of Schneckloth, see su-
pra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 48:173
OHIO V. ROBINETE
that it "would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal
consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warn-
ing," °1 and so too, in the case at hand, the Chief Justice ruled
that it would be "unrealistic to require police officers to always
inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search
may be deemed voluntary."' "°a Because voluntariness was to be
determined by all of the circumstances surrounding the consent,
and because the majority believed that the Ohio Supreme Court
had said otherwise, its decision was reversed. 3
2. Justice Ginsberg's Concurring Opinion
Justice Ginsberg, concurring in the judgment, began her sepa-
rate opinion by reiterating the observations of the Ohio Supreme
Court that traffic stops in Ohio were regularly becoming vehicles
for contraband searches, despite the fact that police officers had no
reason to suspect illegal activity."4 One Ohio court of appeals
had noted that "hundreds, and perhaps thousands of Ohio citizens
are being routinely delayed in their travels and asked to relinquish
to uniformed police officers their right to privacy in their automo-
biles and luggage, sometimes for no better reason than to provide
an officer the opportunity to 'practice' his drug interdiction tech-
nique." '' Indeed, Deputy Newsome had himself testified on a
prior occasion to having made 786 consensual searches in 1992
alone. °  Justice Ginsberg recognized that the Ohio Supreme
Court had announced the "first-tell-then-ask" rule in order to more
effectively protect the constitutional rights of Ohio citizens to be
secure in their persons and property. 7
Although agreeing with the majority that the Ohio Supreme
Court had not so clearly rested its decision on state law so as to
avoid review under the test outlined in Michigan v. Long,"' Jus-
tice Ginsberg nonetheless believed that the majority opinion "[did]
... Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 42 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231).
102 Id.
" See id. ("The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the con-
sent be voluntary, and '[voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances.' The Supreme Court of Ohio having held otherwise, its judgment is re-
versed.") (citations omitted).
"4 See id. at 421-22 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
'o Id. at 422 (citing State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ohio 1994)).
See id. (citing Retherford, 639 N.E.2d at 503 n.3). Robinette was arrested in 1992.
107. See id.
'8 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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not pass judgment on the wisdom of the first-tell-then-ask
rule."' States were of course free to place greater restrictions on
law enforcement practices than did the Federal Constitution,"' but
by failing to clearly emphasize that its rule was based on state law,
and applicable only to Ohio officials, the Ohio Supreme Court had
inadvertently signaled a belief "that the Nation's Constitution
would require the rule in all 50 States.'. Although Justice
Ginsberg expressed serious doubt that the Ohio court had intended
this, she nonetheless agreed with the majority that, in so far as
federal law imposed no such restriction on law enforcement activi-
ty, the Ohio Supreme Court decision should be reversed.
Justice Ginsberg then returned to the rule itself, finding that its
intent appeared similar to that of the per se rule announced by the
Court in Miranda v. Arizona."' While neither rule was specifical-
ly required by the text of any constitution, federal or state, both
rules could be viewed as prophylactic measures to ensure a mini-
mally required standard and "to reduce the number of violations of
textually guaranteed rights..'" 3  However, the United States Su-
preme Court was empowered to announce rules like that of
Miranda upon all fifty states, whereas the Ohio court was not. This
point served to confirm for Justice Ginsberg that the Ohio Supreme
Court had intended its rule to apply only to Ohio." 4
Finally, Justice Ginsberg stressed the need for state courts to
clearly indicate their reliance on state law to announce new legal
rules invoking elements of federal law."' On remand, noted Jus-
Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 422.
See id. at 422-23 (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)) ("A state is
free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than
those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.").
Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 423.
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
,3 Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 423.
114 See id.
"5 See id. at 423-24. As an example of the clarity required, Justice Ginsberg offered
the example of the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Fuller, 915 P.2d 809, (Mont.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 301 (1996), in which the court had stated:
while we have devoted considerable time to a lengthy discussion of the appli-
cation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it is to be
noted that this holding is also based separately and independently on [the de-
fendant's] right to remain silent pursuant to Article II, Section 25 of the Mon-
tana Constitution.
Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 423-24 (citing Fuller, 915 P.2d at 816) (alteration in
original).
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tice Ginsberg, the Ohio Supreme Court was free to clarify "that its
instructions to law-enforcement officers in Ohio find adequate and
independent support in state law, and that in issuing these instruc-
tions, the court [had] endeavored to state dispositively only the law
applicable in Ohio..' ..6
3. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority in its response to the
sole question presented for review, that the Federal Constitution did
not require police officers to advise lawfully detained motorists that
they were "free to go" before a consent to search would be recog-
nized as voluntary."7 However, because the "free to go" rule in
the second part of the Ohio court's syllabus was clearly intended
as a guide for deciding future cases, and because the Ohio Su-
preme Court had correctly found that Robinette's consent had
resulted from an unlawful detention, Justice Stevens would have
affirmed the decision of the Ohio court."'
Believing the issue to be whether Robinette was still being
detained at the point in time when Deputy Newsome asked his
"One more question before you get gone," Justice Stevens noted
that the Ohio Supreme Court had correctly relied on the United
States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mendenhall,'"
in which the Court had ruled that "a person has been 'seized'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment... if, in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' ' 2 Ex-
amining the circumstances surrounding Robinette's interrogation,
the dissent concluded that both of the Ohio appellate courts had
correctly decided that a reasonable person in Robinette's shoes
would have believed there was an obligation to answer the depu-
ty's question, and that getting back into the vehicle and driving
away was simply not an option.'2'
-' Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 424. See KA7z_ supra note 80, § 15.05 ("It
seems the [Ohio Supreme Court] has three choices: (1) pursue the issue of the continued
detention, (2) determine whether the bright-line rule requiring a clear statement that the
motorist is free to go is required under the Ohio Constitution, or (3) accept the federal
rule.").
,,* See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" See id.
,. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
'* Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 424-25 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).
2. See id. at 425-26. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens noted that "the ques-
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Not only had the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Robinette
had been seized, but it had done so independently of the bright-
line rule announced in the second part of its syllabus." As such,
Justice Stevens believed the lower court's factual finding with
respect to Robinette's detention should remain undisturbed."
The question then became whether Robinette's detention had been
unlawful. The dissent pointed to the language of the first syllabus
wherein the Ohio Supreme Court had declared the seizure illegal
because the motivation for Newsome's continued interrogation had
not been "related to the purpose of the original, constitutional
stop."'24 The majority had construed the phrase "motivation be-
hind" to mean the deputy's subjective motivation, and had re-
sponded with its decision in Whren v. United States."2 In con-
trast, Justice Stevens would have construed the "motivation behind"
language to mean "justification for," thereby rendering the first part
of the syllabus a correct proposition of law."2 Thus, in order for
Robinette's detention to remain lawful beyond the point at which
he had received his warning, Deputy Newsome would have needed
"articulable facts giv[ing] rise to a reasonable suspicion of some
separate illegal activity."' 7 In the absence of any such factual
basis, the Ohio Supreme Court's determination that Robinette was
illegally seized was "entirely consistent with federal law.'"" Be-
cause Robinette's consent had been tainted by the illegality of his
detention, and because the United States Supreme Court "reviews
judgments, not opinions,"'2 9 Justice Stevens repeated his desire to
affirm the decision of the Ohio court."'°
Finally, Justice Stevens turned to the "free to go" rule itself.
tion itself sought an answer 'before you get gone."' Id. at 425; see also State v.
Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 419
(1996) (discussing the Ohio Supreme Court's similar observation).
'" See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 426. Justice Stevens noted that in the first
paragraph of its opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court had made it clear that it had based its
decision on Robinette's unlawful seizure, and that "[o]nly then did the court proceed to
point out that it would 'also use this case to establish a bright-line test.'" Id. at 426
n.7.
-" See id. at 426.
12'L Id.
' See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
1. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 426.
. Id. at 426-27.
' Id. at 427.
I. d. (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
" See id.
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Agreeing with Justice Ginsberg that the majority had not passed on
the wisdom of the Ohio Supreme Court's rule or its validity as a
matter of Ohio law, the dissent stressed that nothing prevented the
State of Ohio from promulgating rules proscribing the conduct of
its law-enforcement officers, the effect of which was to grant its
citizens additional protection beyond that mandated by the Federal
Constitution.' However, because federal law imposed no such
requirement on police officers, Justice Stevens, while dissenting
from the majority's disposition of the case, nonetheless approved
of the Court's treatment of the "free to go" rule.
32
II. A MOST "UNREALISTIC" RESULT
The remainder of this Comment takes issue with the majority
opinion, finding it unpersuasive, unsupported, and in places, simply
inaccurate. Besides misconstruing the intended effect of the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision and ignoring prior judicial acceptance of
per se rules, the majority opinion, ruling that the Fourth
Amendment does not require a lawfully seized defendant to be told
he or she is free to go before a consent to search will be deemed
voluntary, is a decision full of Fourth Amendment clich6s, but
short of any substantive factual analysis.
A. Bright-line Confusion
In declaring that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
requires an examination of the "totality of the circumstances" in
order to give account of the "endless variations in the facts and
circumstances," the majority claimed to have "consistently es-
chewed bright-line rules.' 33 By way of example, the Court made
specific reference to two of its prior decisions that had rejected
proposed bright-line rules. 4 In Michigan v. Chesternut, '3 the
Court had rejected a per se rule for deciding whether an investiga-
tory pursuit was a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.'
3. See id. at 427-28.
'" See id. at 428.
"' Id. at 421.
"' See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
". 486 U.S. 567 (1975).
136 Id. The state had proposed a rule that police investigatory pursuits never implicate
the Fourth Amendment unless a defendant is actually apprehended, while the defendant
had argued that any and all police chases were per se seizures. See id. at 572. The Court
rejected both rules, finding instead that "any assessment as to whether police conduct
amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account 'all of the
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Similarly, in Florida v. Bostick, 37 the Court struck down a rule
announced by the Florida Supreme Court that police interrogation
of citizens aboard buses were per se seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.' While these cases do indeed support the Court's
claim to have previously "eschewed" bright-line rules, in claiming
to have done so "consistently," the majority apparently overlooked,
or chose simply to ignore, a number of its previous decisions in
which per se rules had been deemed an appropriate mechanism for
protecting Fourth Amendment rights.
On a number of occasions the United States Supreme Court
has willingly approved of bright-line rules, notwithstanding the
purported necessity of recognizing the "endless variations in the
facts and circumstances" implicated by the Fourth Amendment.
One such example is the Court's earlier decision in Michigan v
Summers.'39 In Summers, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
ruled that because a judge had determined there was probable
cause to search a house, it was per se reasonable to detain the
occupant while the search warrant was executedY The Court
stated: "The connection of an occupant to [the] home gives the
police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determin-
ing that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of [the]
occupant.''. Thus, the authority required to detain an occupant
could always be implied from a properly issued search warrant.
circumstances surrounding the incident' in each individual case." Id. (citing INS v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)).
. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
'3 See id. at 433. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor reiterated that
[t]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a
court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to deter-
mine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable
person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or other-
wise terminate the encounter.
Id. at 439.
1-. 452 U.S. 692 (1981). In Summers, the occupant of a house had been detained
while police officers executed a search warrant on the premises. See id. at 693. The occu-
pant later claimed his detention had been an illegal seizure because it had not been justi-
fied by probable cause. After drugs were found on the premises, the occupant was arrest-
ed, and during a search incidental to his arrest, police found additional contraband on his
person. The occupant did not challenge the search made pursuant to the arrest, but rather
the pre-arrest seizure from which the search resulted. See id. at 693-96.
'" See id. at 703 ("Thus a neutral magistrate rather than an officer in the field has
made the critical determination that the police should be given a special authorization to
thrust themselves into the privacy of a home.").
"I- Id. at 703-04.
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In its ruling the Court made a footnote reference to its decision
in Dunaway v. New York. 42 Dunaway had rejected a totality of
the circumstances approach, reaffirming instead a general rule that
custodial interrogations were per se unreasonable in the absence of
probable cause.43 Although Terry and its progeny had created
specific exceptions to this rule, the state of New York had urged
the Court to replace the per se rule with a "multifactor balancing
test of 'reasonable police conduct under the circumstances' to
cover all seizures that do not amount to technical arrests."'" Re-
jecting such a test, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted:
[T]he protections intended by the Framers could all too
easily disappear in the consideration and balancing of the
multifarious circumstances presented by different cases,
especially when that balancing may be done in the first
instance by police officers engaged in the "often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime." A single, familiar
standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only
limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the
social and individual interests involved in the specific cir-
cumstances they confront. 45
Because the police officers had not attained that "single, familiar
standard" of probable cause, notwithstanding the officers' reasons
for suspecting Dunaway, his detention had been an illegal seizure,
and any resulting confession was tainted thereby.'"
Justice White similarly underscored the Court's preference for
bright-line rules in his concurring opinion. Noting that the Fourth
Amendment generally did indeed require a balancing of competing
interests, Justice White remarked that "if courts and law enforce-
ment officials are to have workable rules this balancing must in
large part be done on a categorical basis-not in an ad hoc, case-
by-case fashion by individual police officers."' 47  Hence, in
Dunaway, a majority of the United States Supreme Court apparent-
ly recognized the potential for abuse inherent in allowing the totali-
'z 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
"" See id. at 211 ("Respondent State now urges the Court to apply a balancing test,
rather than the general rule, to custodial interrogations, and to hold that 'seizures' such
as that in this case may be justified by mere 'reasonable suspicion.").
14 Id. at 213.
Id. at 213-14 (citations omitted).
" See id. at 216-19.
" d. at 219-20 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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ty of the circumstances surrounding an encounter to substitute for a
per se rule proscribing official conduct.
Other examples illustrate similar concerns. In Oliver v. United
States,"4 the Court was called upon to reevaluate its prior ruling
that the Fourth Amendment did not extend its protections to "open
fields. ' 49 Oliver had argued that in place of this per se rule, the
Court should instead analyze the circumstances on a case-by-case
basis in order to determine whether or not a defendant had a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy.'5 ° Noting that the accommodation to
be made was between the needs of law enforcement and the liberty
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Court remarked
that such a test would result in police officers having to guess pri-
or to each search "whether landowners had erected fences suffi-
ciently high, posted a sufficient number of warning signs, or locat-
ed contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to establish a right
of privacy."'"' This type of approach would confuse police offi-
cers in their attempts to ascertain the scope of their authority, and
would result in arbitrary and inequitable enforcement of constitu-
tionally protected rights.152 In retaining the Hester test, Justice
Powell noted that the United States Supreme Court "repeatedly has
acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens
by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment stan-
dards to be applied in differing factual circumstances."'5 Thus,
the Court retained the per se rule announced in Hester that individ-
uals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their open
fields.154
In its claim to have "consistently eschewed bright-line rules,"
the majority in'Robinette was apparently unaware of how hollow
this claim would ring when, only a month later, the Court accepted
", 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
49. In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), the Court held that "[t]he spe-
cial protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses,
papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields."
'0- See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
"'1 Ido
1. See id. at 181-82; see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981)
(stating that "[w]hen a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to
a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional pro-
tection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority").
". Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
"s For yet another example of the Court's approval of bright-line rules, see New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (police officer may search passenger compartment of
vehicle, including containers found within, pursuant to a lawful arrest of the occupants).
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a per se rule in a Fourth Amendment traffic stop context. In Mary-
land v. Wilson,' Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled that it was per se
reasonable to order a passenger from a legally detained vehicle, re-
gardless of any articulable suspicion that the passenger posed a
threat to the officer or had committed a criminal offense.'56 In-
deed, Wilson extended the application of another bright-line rule
previously announced in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, '"which stated
that it was not unreasonable for a police officer to order the driver
out of a detained vehicle, a rule purportedly based on the minimal
intrusion to the driver who had already been detained, and the sub-
stantial interest in ensuring the safety of police officers. In an ef-
fort to save face, the Wilson majority tacitly acknowledged that al-
though the Court had "generally eschewed bright-line rules,"'' 8 it
had not always done so. In its reference to Robinette, the Court
was prudent enough to avoid any suggestion that its eschewing of
bright-line rules had been "consistent."
As these cases illustrate, the United States Supreme Court has
been anything but consistent in its approach to bright-line rules. In-
deed, the only consistency would appear to be the manner in
which the Court has used the totality of the circumstances approach
to extend the scope of police investigatory methods, while using
bright-line rules to restrict constitutional protections. As one com-
mentator has noted, "the Court appears to adopt bright-lin6 rules
where it would expand a previously limited search and to reject
bright-line rules where the rule would act as a brake on police in-
trusions."'' 9 Chesternut and Bostick, rejecting per se rules, both
gave the green light for law enforcement officers to use investiga-
tive methods that were suspect under the existing constitutional
framework. In contrast, Wilson eradicated the Fourth Amendment
rights of passengers in the interest of officer safety, while Oliver
and Summers .seemed primarily concerned with eliminating the in-
convenience and confusion experienced by officers in the field. In
claiming to have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, the Court
'5- 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
1'6 Id. at 886.
,v. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
's Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885 n.1 (emphasis added).
'" James A. Adams, -Search and Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are
They Serious or Is This Just Judicial Humor, 12 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 413, 451-52
(1993) (footnotes omitted). Adams argues that the inconsistency in the Courts Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence can only be explained as an effort by the Court to be humor-
ous! Id.
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ignored its own jurisprudence of having approved of them in con-
texts where the Court became convinced that effective law enforce-
ment required a limiting of individuals' liberty interests.)" Given
the apparent correlation between the purpose behind a proposed per
se rule, and the Court's acceptance or rejection of it, the majority
decision in Robinette is hardly surprising.
B. The Potential for Coercion: Schneckloth Revisited
While the Court's approach to per se rules might explain the
Robinette decision, it does not justify it. Nor indeed is Robinette
justified by the Court's reliance on Schneckloth. The Robinette
majority stated that it would be "unrealistic" to expect police offi-
cers to give warnings to detained motorists that they were free to
go.16 Without offering examples or factual evidence to support
this assertion, the Court suggested that such warnings would be
unrealistic for the same reasons that had led the Court in
Schneckloth to conclude that it would be "thoroughly impractical"
to require a criminal prosecutor to demonstrate that a defendant
knew of his or her right to refuse to consent to a search." Thus,
the Court's rejection of the "free to go" test would appear to be
based entirely on the impracticalities identified in Schneckloth.
Although Schneckloth itself dealt with the issue of whether a
volunthry consent search required the defendant to have actual
knowledge of a right to withhold consent, the Court also discussed
a suggestion that police officers be required instead to simply ad-
vise defendants of their right to refuse. 63 It was in the course of
this discussion that the Court invoked its "thoroughly impractical"
language, Justice Stewart maintaining that such a requirement
would be "thoroughly impractical to impose" and that federal and
' As Professor Adams notes: "Bright-line rulemaking in search and seizure cases is
either humor or an art form; it definitely is not a science." Id.
"6. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
6" See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1973).
" See id. at 231 ("One alternative that would go far toward proving that the subject
of a search did know he had a right to refuse consent would be to advise him of that
right before eliciting his consent."). This "alternative" discussion may explain why the
Robinette majority believed the rule at issue was "very similar" to the rule rejected in
Schneckloth. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421. However, there would appear to
be a substantial difference between a test involving the observable conduct of a police of-
ficer, and a test requiring the state to prove a defendant's mental state. As Justice
Stewart remarked with regards the latter of these tests, "the near impossibility of meeting
this prosecutorial burden suggests why this Court has never accepted any such litmnus-pa-
per test of voluntariness." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230.
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state courts had consistently rejected it" 4 Although not offering
any concrete examples of how a police officer might find such a
requirement impractical, Justice Stewart noted that consent searches
"normally occur on the highway, or in a person's home or office,
and under informal and unstructured conditions,"" as opposed to
both the structured atmosphere of a trial and the custodial interro-
gations that had precipitated the rule in Miranda.s Although not-
ing that the circumstances prompting a consent search request can
develop quickly and may arise as a "logical extension of investiga-
tive police questioning," the majority simply did not offer anything
by way of specific example to illustrate why it would be "thor-
oughly impractical" for law enforcement officers to comply with
such a rule."
'6t Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231.
15 Id. at 232. In his dissent, Justice Marshall remarked-
The Court contends that if an officer paused to inform the subject of his
rights, the informality of the exchange would be destroyed. I doubt that a sim-
ple statement by an officer of an individual's right to refuse consent would
do much to alter the informality of the exchange, except to alert the subject to
a fact that he surely is entitled to know.
Id. at 287.
1- 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232. In his dissent, Justice Marshall responded as follows:
[W]hen the Court speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the con-
tinued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to
accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the
knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights. Of course it would be "practi-
cal" for the police to ignore the commands of the Fourth Amendment, if by
practicality we mean that more criminals will be apprehended, even though the
constitutional rights of innocent people also go by the board. But such a practi-
cal advantage is achieved only at the cost of permitting the police to disregard
the limitations that the Constitution places on their behavior, a cost that a
constitutional democracy cannot long absorb.
Id. at 288. Professor Adams has offered his own response to the Court's assertion that
such a warning would be impractical:
It simply is not impractical to give a warning in terms of language required,
duration of the warning and the exigencies of most such searches. The Fifth
Amendment warning about an individual's right not to incriminate oneself ap-
parently can be "effectively" conveyed in a sentence stating- "You have the
right to remain silent; anything you say can and will be used against you."
Two more clauses advise the suspect about the right to assistance of counsel.
Surely a statement to a citizen that "You have a right to refuse to consent to
any search" would be neither terribly time consuming nor would it appreciably
delay the search if consent were given.
Adams, supra note 159, at 447. Certainly, the many police departments that currently use
the warning as a matter of good police practice would not appear to find the requirement
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According to Justice Stevens, the considerations belying the
Miranda result were inapplicable in the context of consent search-
es. Miranda had required detailed warnings to protect against self-
incrimination because "the techniques of police questioning and the
nature of custodial surroundings produce[d] an inherently coercive
situation.""' By contrast, "since consent searches will normally
occur on a person's own familiar territory, the specter of incom-
municado police interrogation in some remote station house [was]
simply inapposite.""1 9 And because there was no reason to pre-
sume police coercion, there was no need for detailed warnings in
order to determine whether a consent to search had been voluntari-
ly given.
By using the Schneckloth decision to support its rejection of
the "free to go" rule, the Robinette majority clearly signaled its be-
lief that routine traffic stops are devoid of the inherently coercive
qualities associated with custodial interrogations. Indeed, this find-
ing is consistent with the Court's previous decision in Berkemer v.
McCarty.7 In Berkemer, the Court had been asked to decide
whether the roadside questioning of motorists detained pursuant to
traffic stops constituted a "custodial interrogation" for purposes of
the Miranda rule. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, ruled
that "[t]wo features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger
that a person questioned will be induced 'to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely."""' The first of these was the pre-
sumptively brief and temporary nature of traffic stops, as opposed
to the prolonged nature of station house interrogations. The Court
observed that during a traffic stop a motorist expects to receive a
citation, but that eventually, "he most likely will be allowed to
continue on his way."' In addition, the brevity of the stop en-
sured that officers had little opportunity to develop and implement
the questionable investigative methods that Miranda had sought to
guard against.73
terribly impractical. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
'" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247.
169. id.
"2 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
Id. at 437 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
172 Id. at 437.
'r See id. at 438 n.27:
The brevity and spontaneity of an ordinary traffic stop also reduces the danger
that the driver through subterfuge will be made to incriminate himself. One of
the investigative techniques that Miranda was' designed to guard against was the
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The second feature of traffic stops that served to lessen the op-
portunity for coercive police conduct was that motorists did not
feel completely at the mercy of the officer. In particular, because
traffic stops were conducted in public, the exposure to other pass-
ing motorists "both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous police-
man to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements
and diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he
will be subjected to abuse."''
By declining to revisit the assumptions made about traffic stops
in Schneckloth and Berkemer, the United States Supreme Court has
effectively ruled that despite an escalating "war on drugs,"'75 rou-
tine traffic stops remain devoid of the features previously deemed
to merit a presumption of coercion. In doing so, the Court has
failed to appreciate that traffic stops often implicate a number of
the characteristics present in Justice Stevens' "remote station
house" example.
Citizens stopped and ordered from their vehicles are no less
disoriented by their physical surroundings than would be the case
in a typical interrogation room. Many stops are at night, often at
the sides of busy motorways, where other vehicles continue to
speed past. Often the stop will occur on a stretch of road with
which the motorist is unfamiliar, thereby adding to the confusion.
Although Berkemer suggests that motorists should take comfort at
the public exposure they are thereby subjected to,76 the Court
has on a prior occasion recognized the substantial anxiety associat-
ed with roadside stops."v In reality, the motorist standing on the
side of a busy highway, possibly in inclement weather conditions,
and with the public roaring past, is just as exposed to the "inher-
ently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individu-
al's will"'78 as a defendant in a remote station house.
use by police of various kinds of trickery-such as "Mutt and Jeff" rou-
tines-to elicit confessions from suspects. A police officer who stops a suspect
on the highway has little chance to develop or implement a plan of this sort.
(citations omitted).
'14 Id. at 438.
," See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 440 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Our
Nation, we are told, is engaged in a 'war on drugs.'").
"7 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
"t. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979) (discussing "substantial anxiety"
wrought by police randomly stopping a vehicle).
,"d Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 247 (1973) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
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Nor is there continued reason, assuming there was any, to be-
lieve that traffic stops are presumptively brief'79 and limited in
scope to the reasons prompting their initiation." ° The American
Civil Liberties Union, as amicus, offered the Robinette majority
various examples of traffic stops of extended length and of sub-
stantial intrusiveness.' For example, George Karnes, a business-
man stopped for speeding in Pennsylvania, refused to allow police
officers to search his vehicle, and was only released after two and
a half hours." Even consenting to a search does not necessarily
result in the length of a stop being reduced. Craig Kirby, an Ala-
bama textile worker, was stopped for speeding on Interstate 10 in
Louisiana:
When the officer asked him whether he could search the
car, Kirby said: "Fine." The next thing he knew, Kirby was
spread-eagled against the side of his car. The officer
searched his luggage and trunk and looked under his hood
and dashboard. But the search didn't stop there. The offi-
cer ... made him drive to a gas station, where he had
mechanics take apart his spare tire. The officers also disas-
sembled his seats .... They found no drugs and told Kirby
he was free to go. The ordeal lasted an hour and a
half.'83
Unfortunately, as the majority opinion makes clear, the Court was
not disposed to reconsider its prior rulings that traffic stops are
presumed to be brief and temporary, notwithstanding evidence to
'" Certainly, Justice Kennedy would appear to have conceded this point. See Maryland
v. Wilson, 117 U.S. 882, 890 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Traffic stops, even for
minor violations, can take upwards of 30 minutes.").
" "mhe stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the justification for
their initiation."' United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)). But see KArZ, supra note 80, at § 15.05:
The United States Supreme Court has never shown any inclination to restrict
the subject matter of police discussion with a person stopped for a traffic of-
fense. Ohio courts have taken a completely different tack indicating that police
may not question or investigate motorists stopped for a traffic violation about
other offenses unless reasonable suspicion arises to warrant further investigation
into unrelated matters.
8, See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of
Ohio at 26-29, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct 417 (1996) (No. 95-891).
,"2 See id. at 26. The officer did not let Karnes leave but instead called for a K-9 of-
ficer with a drug-sniffing dog. When Karnes again refused to consent, the K-9 officer
sniffed around the car twice, detecting no drugs. See id.
- Id. at 28-29.
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the contrary. Although the examples offered by the ACLU are
clearly anecdotal, even anecdotal evidence deserves consideration
when it rebuts a presumption otherwise unsupported.
In Schneckloth, the Court stressed that Miranda had concerned
itself with suspects detained in custody, and that its application did
not extend to non-custodial "on-the-scene questioning.""' Howev-
er, the claim that the potential for coercion is mitigated in non-
custodial situations has little factual basis with which to recom-
mend itself. One commentator, relying on the experiments of noted
social psychologists Stanley Milgram and Leonard Bickman, con-
cludes that "powerful psychological forces are at work even in the
noncustodial police-citizen encounter."'" Milgram found that obe-
dience to authority is "a deeply ingrained behavior tendency"'
in all people, while Bickman concluded that "the degree to which a
person obeys authority largely depends upon the uniform worn by
the authority figure."'" The visible trappings of authority dis-
played by police officers, in particular their badges, weapons, and
uniforms, combine with a citizen's substantial propensity to obey
authority, to transform the officer's request to search into a "cour-
teous expression of demand backed by force of law."'88 Hence,
"obedience theory casts serious doubt on the continued vitality of
what Schneckloth characterized as Miranda's central holding: that
custody is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of psychological
coercion."'89
The potential for coercive police conduct present during routine
traffic stops is only enhanced by the extraordinary discretion police
officers exercise with respect to the penalties that may result. Once
a traffic violation has occurred, the officer may have discretion to
simply warn the driver not to repeat the conduct in the future, or
he or she may issue a citation for the offense, which can result in
a costly fine."9° The enormous discretion an officer has to decide
the consequences a motorist will face as a result of the traffic
"s Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 240 n.29 (1973).
I8. Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedi-
ence Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 97 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 240 (1997).
" Id. at 234.
Id. at 238.
'I Id. at 241-42.
". Id. at 240.
In this case, Robinette was issued a warning for his speeding, although clearly
Deputy Newsome could have written a citation.
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infraction, albeit a ticket or a warning, is the functional equivalent
of the "Mutt and Jeff" interrogation technique that Miranda sought
to protect against.'91 If a motorist refuses to allow the officer to
search the vehicle, the officer may express disapproval by issuing a
ticket for the infraction, while another motorist stopped for the
same traffic violation may sacrifice his or her right to privacy in
order to escape with a warning." As Professor LaFave has not-
ed, "a police procedure is less threatening to Fourth Amendment
values when the discretionary authority of the police (and thus the
risk of arbitrary action) is kept at an absolute minimum.""' The
Court's rejection of the "free-to-go" rule will doubtless embolden
police officers to make the most of the discretion granted them." 4
C. Right Case, Wrong Rule
The paucity of support in the majority opinion, and its lack of
factual considerations, can in part be explained by the manner in
which the Court formulated the question presented for review.
Clearly, the rule promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court was not
as broad or as sweeping as the issue that the United States Su-
" See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452 (1966). A "Mutt and Jeff" routine, al-
so called the "good-cop, bad-cop" routine, is a police interrogation method designed to
coerce a confession from a suspect by using two investigators, one of which is hostile to
the defendant, while the other expresses empathy and secretly offers to help the suspect if
only he or she will cooperate. See id.
192 At oral argument, one of the Justices stressed the relevance of this discretion:
Maybe we should adopt a new rule that in addition to when you're still in
custody, there's another situation in which things have to be made absolutely
clear, and that is, when your denial of permission for a search may impose
upon you some sanction that otherwise wouldn't be imposed . . . I mean,
there is the suggestion here that even if this person was no longer under custo-
dy, his saying no to the search of his car might have produced a traffic tick-
et . . . I would have taken the traffic ticket rather than the conviction for
marijuana, but does that coercion invalidate the search?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S.Ct 417 (1996) (No. 95-
891). Certainly, a refusal to consent does not itself provide reasonable suspicion justifying
a continued detention. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) ("We have con-
sistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level
of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.").
'93- 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARcH AND SaZuRE § 10.8(d) at 696 (1996) (commenting
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of an immigration check-
point).
'" See Dripps, supra note 29, at 68 ("If, as Deputy Newsome testified he does, police
routinely ask people stopped for traffic violations to consent to a search, and if most of
those asked feel compelled to consent, the only security against searches lies in the appar-
ently impossible challenge of perfect driving.").
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preme Court undertook to resolve. Setting aside the peculiarities
surrounding the legal significance of the syllabus in Ohio Supreme
Court opinions,' the Court clearly stated in the second sentence
of its opinion, "We find that the search was invalid since it was
the product of an unlawful seizure."" While the Uniteil States
Supreme Court discussed the legal standards pertaining to
voluntariness in the context of consent searches, the Ohio Supreme
Court had focused instead on the seamless transition between a
detention and a consensual encounter."9 Indeed, the Ohio court
cited Florida v. Royer 98 for the proposition that a consent given
in the course of an illegal detention is only valid if the state
proves that "the consent was not the product of the illegal deten-
tion but the result of an independent act of free will."' The
Court then applied this test to the facts of the case, finding that the
state had failed to meet its burden. In dealing with the predicate
jurisdictional questions,' the United States Supreme Court
claimed it was "permissible for [the Court] to turn to the body of
the opinion to discern the grounds for decision." ' Had the Court
done so, it would have discovered that the Ohio Supreme Court
made no reference to the totality of the circumstances test for
determining whether a consent has been made voluntarily, and
certainly did not suggest that such a test be supplanted by a rule
requiring all consents to be preceded by the "free-to-go" lan-
guage.
What makes this observation more startling is that Chief Justice
Rehnquist was apparently aware of it. In response to Robinette's
contention that the basis for the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
would preclude the United States Supreme Court from reaching the
question presented for review, the majority elected to treat the
legality of the detention as a predicate question "fairly included" in
' See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
'9 State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, Ohio v. Robinette,
117 S. Ct. 417 (1996) (emphasis added).
-- See id. at 698-99.
' 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
"' State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
:" Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 420 (1996).
2 But see id. at 421 ("The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is
that the consent be voluntary, and '[violuntariness is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstanecs.' The Supreme Court of Ohio having held otherwise, its judg-
ment is reversed") (citations omitted).
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its ultimate decision. 3 The Court then construed the Ohio court
as having found the detention to be illegal based on the subjective
motivations of Deputy Newsome, notwithstanding the lower
court's concern with detentions that went beyond the purpose of
the original stop. 4 Having done so, the predicate question be-
came a rather simple one in light of the Court's prior decision in
Whren.0
Unfortunately, the Chief Justice, in his haste to strike down the
"free-to-go" rule, did not pause to consider an alternative possibili-
ty. If the Ohio Supreme Court had wrongly concluded that
Robinette had been illegally detained, then a more restrained dispo-
sition would have been to remand the case for reconsideration,
with instructions for the Ohio Supreme Court to determine whether
Robinette had voluntarily consented to the search based on his
detention being legal. Presumably, only if the majority had agreed
with the Ohio Supreme Court that Robinette had been illegally
detained would they then have needed to consider the lower
court's treatment of the voluntariness of the consent. Alternatively,
because the trial court made a factual finding that the traffic matter
had concluded prior to Robinette giving his consent, the Court
could simply have reversed the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling to
the contrary, without passing on the "free to go" rule.' Regretta-
bly, because only Justice Stevens in his dissent was prepared to
acknowledge the potentially dispositive effect of the majority's
ruling on the legality of Robinette's detention, the Court, in
essence, crafted a "straw rule," a rule not even considered by the
lower courts, and barely touched upon in the briefs submitted by
the parties. It is hardly surprising that the Chief Justice
dispatchedthe rule in such rapid fashion. This lack of judicial self-
restraint helps in part to explain the unfortunate result.
Id. at 420. The Court also mentioned that Robinette had not made this argument
in his brief in opposition to certiorari, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 15.2. Id.
See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 698 ("Newsome asked Robinette to step out
of his car for the sole purpose of conducting a line of questioning that was not related to
the initial speeding stop and that was not based on any specific or articulable facts that
would provide probable cause for the extension of the scope of the seizure.").
20" See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
The prospective nature of the rule itself would offer additional support for this dis-
position.
2" This is true, notwithstanding the fact that Justice Stevens would have affirmed the
Ohio court's ruling. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 426 ("[Tlhese determinations
were independent of the bright-line rule criticized by the majority.").
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D. "Free to go" Back to Fourth Amendment Basics
Less than twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court
stated that "the permissibility of a particular law enforcement prac-
tice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests. ''a A proper application of this test requires con-
sideration of not only the "reasonableness" of post-detention inter-
rogations by police officers, measured against an objective stan-
dard,' but also of the extent to which such practices might be
restricted by requiring a prophylactic warning, like the "free-to-go"
rule, as a precursor to any such questioning. While few would
doubt the compelling need for police officers to apprehend and
recover drugs and other contraband, the effectiveness of a particular
method does not itself merit the deprecation of Fourth Amendment
rights.2 0 In retaining the totality of the circumstances approach,
Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently overlooked this test, preferring
instead to declare, without elaboration, that forcing police officers
to give warnings to their detainees was "unrealistic."2 ' This state-
ment is even more astonishing in light of Justice Stevens' observa-
tion that a number of law enforcement agencies make regular use
of such warnings as a matter of "good police practice." '
The totality of the circumstances approach has proved ineffec-
tive as a method of protecting detained motorists from coercive
police conduct, in part because of the judicial assumptions upon
which it relies. A number of the assumptions underlying the test
simply have no factual basis to support them. For example, courts
generally assume that citizens know their substantive rights, includ-
ing the right to leave a police officer mid-interrogation and to go
m Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
W9 See id. (MThe reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts
upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against 'an objective stan-
dard,' whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test") (footnotes omitted).
2,' See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.s. 429, 440 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("the
effectiveness of a law-enforcement technique is not proof of its constitutionality"); Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("the mere fact that law enforcement may be made
more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment").
211. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. CL at 421.
212 Id. at 428 n.12. Justice Stevens relayed information from a brief amicus curiae
filed by Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. which remarked, "[s]uch a warn-
ing may be good police practice, and indeed amicus knows that many law enforcement
agencies among our constituents have routinely incorporated a warning into their Fourth
Amendment consent forms that they use in the field, but it is precisely that-a practice
and not a constitutional imperative." Id.
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their way.213 In reality, empirical research reveals otherwise. As
one commentator has noted in the context of voluntary consent
searches, "the weight of scientific authority suggests that a sus-
pect's ignorance of fundamental Fourth Amendment rights must be
viewed as a state of mind that renders a suspect's consent invol-
untary. ' ' 214 Because the right to refuse consent is commensurate
with, and in some cases predicated on, the right to terminate a
purportedly consensual encounter, it follows that motorists interro-
gated about contraband at the conclusion of a routine traffic stop
are simply unaware of their right to decline the officer's questions
and to go about their business.215 Rather, most people believe
they are in custody as long as a police officer continues to ask
them questions,216 and there is nothing inherently unreasonable in
such a belief. In fact, during a moment of unprecedented candor,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized as much, stating
that "few motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to
pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told
they might do so."217
A more subtle flaw with the totality of the circumstances ap-
proach is that the ad-hoc determinations it favors do not adequately
permit courts to consider the broader societal impact of police
investigative methods in the way that a per se rule permits. An
adjudication based on the circumstances of a single defendant can-
not take cognizance of the impact of post-traffic stop interrogations
23 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) ("So long as a reasonable person
would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his business,' the encounter is
consensual.") (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, (1991)); Barrio, supra
note 185, at 246 n.238 ("When 'a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions,' or otherwise engages in conduct that does not rise to the level of a seizure,
individuals are presumed to know that they are 'free to decline the officers' requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter.") (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-36). The assumption
that individuals know of their right to terminate an encounter with a police officer is not
without its critics. See People v. Spicer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (Cal. Ct App. 1984)
("The rationale for not treating [consensual] encounters as seizures is that the individual is
free to disregard the officer's questions and walk away. While this may be the greatest
legal fiction of the late 20th Century, we are bound to give it due regard.") (citations
omitted); State v. Shy, 373 So. 2d 145, 149 (La. 1979) ("It would be difficult to find in
the annals of the law any instance in which a citizen had successfully exercised this
right.").
Barrio, supra note 185, at 247.
215. See Dripps, supra note 29, at 66 ("The consent doctrine now in practice elevates
the authority to stop to the level of the authority to search").
2& See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of
Ohio at 18, Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996) (No. 95-891).
27. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984).
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as they occur on a larger scale. As Justice Stevens has recently
noted:
Th[e] burden [imposed on citizens] may well be "minimal"
in individual cases. But countless citizens who cherish
individual liberty and are offended, embarrassed, and some-
times provoked by arbitrary official commands may well
consider the burden to be significant. In all events, the
aggregation of thousands upon thousands of petty indigni-
ties has an impact on freedom that I would characterize as
substantial. 2
The totality of the circumstances approach would be of limited use,
for example, if it were shown that police officers in a certain area
were disproportionately requesting consent to search vehicles of
motorists belonging to a particular minority group219 based on a
belief that members of the group were less likely to know of their
right to refuse. The "free-to-go" rule announced by the Ohio Su-
preme Court would effectively remove any incentive for police
officers to engage in this type of conduct. The rule would require
police officers to ensure that all citizens, irrespective of member-
ship in any minority group, be equally well informed, at least with
respect to their right not to have to wait around and undergo fur-
ther interrogation. 0 Presumably, the benefits in knowledge dis-
parity accruing to police officers from selectively targeting minority
motorists would all but disappear. Although the totality of the
circumstances approach may consider factors such as race and level
of education, courts cannot deter the police conduct in question
without systematically suppressing all evidence perceived to have
211. Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 888 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
and footnote omitted).
29. This may not be as "hypothetical" as it appears. See Luther Wright, Jr., Note,
Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States's
Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAD. L. REv. 513, 555 (1995) ("Judg-
es have noted that there is a nationwide tendency to stop minority drivers ... primarily
because of their race."); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441 n.1 (1991) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (discussing use of race as factor in deciding who to approach in
suspicionless police sweeps of Greyhound buses).
20 The fact that citizens have different degrees of knowledge with respect to their
constitutional rights has been noted by Justice Marshall in his characterization of the
Schneckloth decision as one "confin[ing] the protection of the Fourth Amendment against
searches conducted without probable cause to the sophisticated, the knowledgeable,
and ... the few"). Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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resulted from minority targeting. And this would be functionally
equivalent to a bright-line test, with minority status being the dis-
positive factor.
If traffic stops were actually as brief as the United States Su-
preme Court believes them to be, and if police officers adhered to
the dictates of Terry and its progeny by detaining motorists only
for as long as necessary to conclude the matter giving rise to the
stop, then the "free-to-go" rule .would impose no burden whatsoev-
er on law enforcement techniques. And if police officers are con-
cluding otherwise valid stops by launching into drug interdiction
interrogations without reasonable and articulable suspicion, then the
judiciary need not concern itself with the debilitating effect such a
rule might impose on such methods. Even with the rule in place,
some innocent motorists will 'still seek to assert their innocence by
forgoing their right to refuse and by permitting an officer to con-
duct a search, albeit on a more knowledgeable basis. Certainly, the
rule does not restrict police officers in gathering articulable facts
during the course of the stop from which to justify a prolonged
detention. And, no doubt, some defendants in possession of illicit
contraband, even after having been told of their right to leave, will
still consent to remain for questioning and a possible search, for
reasons best left to speculation."' The "free-to-go" rule is not a
burden on otherwise lawful police activity, but instead a method of
reducing the substantial possibility that police officers will engage
in coercive conduct in situations where they so clearly hold the
psychological upperhand.tm As the United States Supreme Court
once noted, "[i]f the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is some-
thing very wrong with that system."'
Professor Katz has noted that Ohio is a "pioneer state" in the
=' See Barrio, supra note 185, at 242 (suggesting that the question that has baffled
courts and commentators since the inception of the consent search is "[w]hy would a
guilty suspect consent to a search that, by virtue of his guilt, is certain to uncover in-
criminating evidence?"); Dripps, supra note 29, at 66 ("Why would someone with illegal
drugs consent to a search that could lead to a long term in prison? The obvious answer
is that the person did not feel free to withhold consent."). Not surprisingly, in order to
adequately respond to this question the Court has relied on another assumption: that the
individual being asked to consent is an innocent person. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438
("The 'reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person.").
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 289-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court now
sanctions a game of blindman's buff, in which the police always have the upper hand,
for the sake of nothing more than the convenience of the police.").
2" Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
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effort to provide additional protection for its citizens' constitution-
al rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. An
example of this pioneering effort is State v. RetherfordP where-
in the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County ruled that even
though a police officer' had informed the detained motorist that
she was free to go, the ensuing interrogation would not be con-
strued as a consensual encounter." In effect, the court required
that any interrogation beyond that necessary to conclude the initial
traffic violation must be based on reasonable and articulable suspi-
cion.m' Although the Ohio Supreme Court has not expanded con-
stitutional protection to this extent, the case nonetheless illustrates
that in Ohio at least, courts are recognizing the potentially coercive
nature of traffic stops and the increasingly intrusive methods being
used by police officers engaged in the war on drugs. 9 So too, in
the spirit of federalism, state courts are free to develop methods of
their own to restore the constitutional balance. The responsibility of
state courts to do so is only increased by the United States Su-
preme Court's reluctance to do anything that might disrupt the
war effort.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has shown no inclination to
depart from its continued eradication of Fourth Amendment
protections. On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court should be encour-
aged to return to the traditional balancing approach, so long used
to evaluate the reasonableness of police methods, and should reaf-
firm its prior decision that Ohio law requires a per se rule for
KATZ, supra note 80, § 15.01 ("Controlling police conduct during [traffic] stops is
the area of the law where Ohio has been the pioneer state struggling to create new stan-
dards to protect rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment and the Ohio Constitution
while attempting to accommodate legitimate law enforcement needs.").
2' 639 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
None other than Deputy Newsome. See id. at 501.
2 See id. at 507-08.
28 See id.
" For example, the court in Retherford remarked.
[I]t has become clear to us that some police agencies in Ohio are instructing
their officers to routinely ask for the consent of individuals stopped for traffic
violations to search their vehicles and its contents for drugs, weapons, or large
sums of money, even when the officer has little or no suspicion that the occu-
pants of the vehicle are engaged in any criminal activity whatsoever, or that
the vehicle itself contains any contraband.
Id. at 503.
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determining when a lawful detention has become a consensual
encounter. In doing so, the Court should recognize the opportuni-
ties for coercive police conduct presented by routine traffic stops,
and acknowledge that the traditional "totality of the circumstances"
approach has been ineffective at reducing the incidence of such
conduct. Requiring police officers to inform lawfully detained mo-
torists that a traffic stop has concluded as a prerequisite to a subse-
quent consensual encounter does not pose significant burdens on
constitutional law-enforcement techniques,"0 and affords a more
certain basis for decision making to motorists and police officers
alike. And, as Justice Ginsberg cogently observed," the free-to-
go rule does not create additional constitutional rights, but simply
provides a mechanism for reducing the number of violations of
rights already textually guaranteed. z2
The majority opinion in Robinette characterizes the "free-to-go"
rule as "unrealistic." Nearly twenty-five years ago, Justice
Thurgood Marshall concluded his dissent in Schneckloth by sug-
gesting that a proper resolution of the consent issue depended in
part on a "realistic assessment of the nature of the interchange
between citizens and the police," and that the Court could not
avoid "being judged by how well its image of these interchanges
accords with reality. '' "3 To the extent that the Robinette majority
makes no attempt to base its ruling on the actualities of real life
police-citizen encounters, Justice Marshall's admonitions take on a
prophetic ring. Fortunately, the Ohio Supreme Court has before it
the opportunity to demonstrate its own appreciation for the reality
of traffic stops, and to show itself more attuned to the dangers of
coercion they present.
ADDENDUM
On November 12, 1997, after this Comment had been readied
for publication, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision on
2_ See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) ("No system of criminal justice
can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the
citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.").
Z3'. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct 417, 423 (1996) ("The first-tell-then-ask rule
seems to be a prophylactic measure not so much extracted from the text of any constitu-
tional provision as crafted by the Ohio Supreme Court to reduce the number of violations
of textually guaranteed rights.').
23'- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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remand. In a majority opinion written by Justice Lundberg
Stratton the court declined to reaffirm its previous decision under
the adequate and independent ground of the Ohio Constitution. The
court did recognize a current trend among state courts to place
additional restraints on police activity based on state constitutions
"independently of protections afforded by the United States Consti-
tution," a process the court referred to as "New Federalism." '
However, the majority ruled that because the language in Section
14, Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution was virtually identical to the
language found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, there was no reason to depart from earlier holdings
that the two provisions were "coextensive" and offered the same
degree of protection.'
Although rejecting the "free-to-go" rule previously announced,
the majority nonetheless affirmed its prior decision to suppress the
evidence seized during the search of Robinette's vehicle. The ma-
jority acknowledged that the initial stop had been justified because
Robinette had been speeding z7 Ordering Robinette to exit the
vehicle during the traffic stop was also justified based on the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court's prior ruling in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms.3 However, once Deputy Newsome issued the warning to
Robinette, the reason for the stop ended."s9
The majority also modified its original syllabus in the manner
suggested by Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion to take into ac-
count the United States Supreme. Court decision in Whren v. Unit-
ed States.' As modified, the new syllabus read:
When a police officer's objective justification to continue
detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation for the
2" State v. Robinette, No. 94-1143, 9813, 1997 WL 675044 (Ohio Nov. 12, 1997).
"' Id. at *4.
2" See id. at *5. In particular the court made reference to its prior decision in State
v. Geraldo, 68 Ohio St.2d 120, 125 (1981), wherein the court had stated that it was
"disinclined to impose greater restrictions in the absence of explicit state constitutional
guarantees protecting against invasions of privacy that clearly transcend the Fourth Amend-
menL"
2" See Robinette, 1997 WL 675044, at *6.
2" 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (finding it per se reasonable for a police officer to order the
driver of a lawfully stopped vehicle to get out).
2"- See Robinette, 1997 WL 675044, at *6.
2 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (holding that a police officer's subjective motivations do
not invalidate a detention as long as there is objective evidence to support the officer's
conduct).
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purpose of searching the person's vehicle is not related to
the purpose of the original stop, and when that continued
detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise
to a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an exten-
sion of the detention, the continued detention to conduct a
search constitutes an illegal seizure."4
The court then asked whether Deputy Newsome had been objec-
tively justified in detaining Robinette to ask him about contraband
once the speeding warning had been issued.242 According to the
majority, Florida v. Royer 3 and Brown v. Texas'" together
stood for the proposition that "police officers under certain circum-
stances, may briefly detain an individual without reasonably
articulable facts giving rise to suspicion of criminal activity, if the
detention promotes a legitimate public concern, e.g., removing
drunk drivers from public roadways or reducing drug trade."2
Because the drug interdiction policy Deputy Newsome was operat-
ing pursuant to promoted a public interest in quelling the drug
trade, the continued detention of Robinette was justified even
though Newsome had no reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity on the part of Robinette2'
However, once the contraband question had been asked, the
majority determined that in order to further detain Robinette and to
request permission to search his vehicle, Deputy Newsome needed
an individualized suspicion of criminal activity 7  Because
Newsome "did not have any reasonably articulable facts or individ-
ualized suspicion to justify Robinette's further detention in order to
ask to search his car," Robinette's detention became unlawful.2'
Recognizing that the .unlawful detention did not end the inquiry,
the majority noted that "voluntary consent, determined under the
totality of the circumstances, may validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search." 9 More specifically, the court declared
that:
2 . Robinette, 1997 WL 675044, at *6.
24. See id.
243. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
",- 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
245. Robinette, 1997 WL 675044, at *7.
26- See id.
247. See id.
24& id.
24. Id. at *8.
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[O]nce an individual has been unlawfully detained by law
enforcement, for his or her consent to be considered an
independent act of free will, the totality of the circumstanc-
es must clearly demonstrate that a reasonable person would
believe that he or she had the freedom to refuse to answer
further questions and could in fact leave.O
Applying this test, the majority believed the record failed to show
Robinette had voluntarily consented to the search."'
In a well-reasoned and thoughtful concurring opinion Justice
Cook took issue with the majority's assertion that once Robinette
had received the warning his continued detention had been reason-
able. 2 The majority had relied on Royer and Brown to support
its position that no individualized suspicion was required to justify
asking Robinette if he had any contraband. However, as Justice
Cook noted, Royer had discussed consensual encounters-situations
where no Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred-and seizures
made pursuant to an officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.' Royer simply did not discuss or offer legal support for
seizures made in the absence of reasonable suspicion." And
while Brown had indeed made reference to situations where per-
sons could be temporarily seized in the absence of any individual
suspicion, the Court had also stated that such seizures were only
reasonable if "carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers."'za Be-
cause the State of Ohio had not argued that Robinette's interroga-
tion had been a consensual encounter, and had offered no evidence
that the drug interdiction policy had met the standards of neutrality
referred to in Brown, in the opinion of Justice Cook, Robinette had
been unlawfully seized at the time Deputy Newsome asked his
20 Id. at *11.
2" See id.
See id. at *12 (Cook, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id,
21 See Id.
2 1 Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). As support for this proposi-
tion, the Court in Brown had made reference to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979), in which the Court had held that a police officer could not stop an automobile to
check the driver's license and registration in the absence of reasonable suspicion, and to
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), in which the Court had approved
of suspicionless stops at permanent checkpoints away from the national border.
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question concerning contraband. 6 Nonetheless, because the State
had not met its burden of showing that the consent to search had
been made during a period of lawful detention, Justice Cook
agreed with the majority that the evidence seized should be sup-
pressed.'
Justice Sweeney, who had dissented in the court's prior deci-
sion, again dissented, this time agreeing with the test announced by
the majority but disagreeing with the majority's determination that
the record failed to show voluntariness." Accordingly, Justice
Sweeney believed "that there was no coercion and that Robinette
voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle." 9
Notwithstanding the logical flaws so effectively noted by Jus-
tice Cook, the most disappointing feature of the majority opinion is
the court's refusal to grant additional protection to Ohio citizens
based on Section 14, Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution. Unfortu-
nately, the court focused primarily on the similarity of the language
used in the federal and state constitutional provisions and the sup-
posed need for harmony, rather than on the enhanced ability of
state courts to recognize and remedy situations where citizens are
inadequately protected under federal jurisprudence. This is especial-
ly surprising given that the majority purported to recognize the
coercive nature of the traffic stops in question. In reviewing the
record the majority noted that Newsome's phrasing of his question,
the "seamless transition" between the issuance of the warning and
the drug interrogation, and the Deputy's superior position of author-
ity all combined to create a situation in which any reasonable
person would have felt compelled to answer the question rather
than to leave.' Indeed, the majority noted that "while
Newsome's questioning was not expressly coercive, the circum-
stances surrounding the request to search made the questioning
impliedly coercive."'
A point worth salvaging from the decision is that while the
"free-to-go" language may not be constitutionally required, the
Ohio Supreme Court nonetheless makes a point of encouraging law
enforcement agencies to consider using it anyway. In a footnote
2 See Robinette, 1997 WL 675044, at *12.
2 See id. at *13.
See id. at *14 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
259. Id.
210 See id. at *10.
261. id.
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passage, the majority states that while the "free-to-go" language
may not be an absolute requirement for showing a voluntary con-
sent:
[I]f police wish to pursue a policy of searching vehicles
without probable cause or reasonably articulable facts, the
police should ensure that the detainee knows that he or she
is free to refuse consent despite the officer's request to
search or risk that any fruits of any such search might be
suppressed. 2
However, while this may indicate the significant weight courts
may attach to an officer's use of the "free-to-go" language as part
of the totality of the circumstances consideration, it is of little
comfort to those who believe the very purpose of the Fourth
Amendment was to preclude law enforcement agencies from
"pursu[ing] a policy of searching vehicles without probable cause
or reasonably articulable facts." 3
IAN D. MIDGLEY
' Id. at *11 n.6.
2' Id.
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